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University Trademarks and “Mixed
Speech” on College Campuses: A Case
Study of Gerlich v. Leath and Student
Free Speech Rights
Nathan Converse*
Higher education has long been a fundamental building block
upon which American democracy is based. The guarantee of free
speech is itself a revered liberty in the American polity; it has, in
turn, served as the catalyst for higher education. Recent events on
college campuses continue to reexamine universities’ role in their
students’ education and push the legal boundaries on student
speech rights. In many instances, however, students’ speech and
expressive viewpoint conflicts with that of other students. Other
times, students’ speech conflicts with the expressive interests of
their university. This Article examines the latter instance in the
context of university trademarks. Gerlich v. Leath, a recent
decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, serves as a case
study to elaborate on the complexities that arise when analyzing
free speech rights in instances where students’ expressive interests
often compete with, and sometimes conflict with, those of public
colleges and universities.
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INTRODUCTION
Higher education has long been a fundamental building block
upon which American democracy is based.1 The guarantee of free
speech serves as the catalyst for higher education,2 which shares a
revered place in the American polity and democratic form of selfgovernment.3 As the Supreme Court famously declared in 1969:
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”4 Indeed, freedom of
expression is imperative to a university’s mission of preparing
students to become informed and engaged citizens.5
1

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education.”); R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the University,
43 J. C. & U. L. 1, 8 nn.53–54 (2017) (quoting DEREK BOK, HIGHER EDUCATION IN
AMERICA 1 (rev. ed. 2015)); Robert M. Hutchins, The College and the Needs of Society,
3 J. GEN. EDUC. 175, 179, 181 (1949).
2
“[T]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools. The college classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional
ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.” Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972).
3
“Public education serves vital national interests in preparing the Nation’s youth for
life in our increasingly complex society and for the duties of citizenship in our
democratic Republic.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988)
(citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
4
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
5
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See also, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603, 87 S. Ct. 675, 683 (1967) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. The classroom is
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a
multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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Despite the importance that the First Amendment plays in the
intellectual and civic development of the American youth,
expressive rights possessed by students are far from “clearly
defined.”6 Indeed, First Amendment case law implicating the
speech rights of students and their expressive interests as speakers
becomes far more complex in the public school and university
setting.7 Universities in particular are bastions of expressive
thought—both academic and otherwise—and it is readily apparent
that contrasting ideas will result in conflicting speech.8 Courts have
contributed to this tension by failing to adhere to a single doctrine
or framework in analyzing free speech claims brought by students
against their universities.9 Without a coherently articulated
framework by which to analyze expressive rights on university
campuses and a proper consideration of the interests involved,
neither students nor higher education institutions can properly
function in harmony.10
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal’s recent addition to First
Amendment jurisprudence in the higher education setting in the
case Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III)11 contributes to a confusing and
largely incoherent body of law surrounding the regulation of
student speech rights on university campuses. While the first
question at issue in Gerlich revolved around whether the public
university had violated a student organization’s First Amendment
rights by denying it use of its federally-registered trademark, the
second question pertained to university officials’ individual
6

“The mixture of muddled reasoning and inconsistent decisions invites needless
litigation . . . While there is more than enough uncertainty to go around throughout all of
the student speech case law, the adjudication of cases involving student speech in schoolsponsored activities is particularly chaotic.” Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First
Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving
School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 721 (2009).
7
See generally Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (holding that the college administration had the
burden to show why a student organization should not be recognized).
8
Id. at 187.
9
See generally Oyama v. Univ. of Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015) (outlining the
tensions of competing expressive interests in the higher education setting and noting
different analytical approaches that various federal circuit courts have taken to this issue).
10
See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 721.
11
861 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2017).
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liability for the constitutional tort.12 Naturally, the heart of this case
hinged on whether it is “clearly established” under the law that the
First Amendment rights of university students in recognized
student organizations are violated when the student organization is
denied unqualified use of their university’s federally-registered
trademark.13 While the Eighth Circuit’s decision reached the right
result in that post-hoc viewpoint discrimination is a never
constitutionally-permissible reason for regulating student speech,
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning relied on an incomplete picture of
the full range of expressive interests at stake. The purpose of this
12
Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 2017) (addressing the
university’s qualified immunity argument, framing the issue as evaluating whether the
university “violated their First Amendment rights by engaging in viewpoint
discrimination”).
13
“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’ While this Court’s case law ‘does not require a case directly on point’ for a right
to be clearly established, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.’ In other words, immunity protects ‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.
548, 551 (2017) (internal citations omitted). Recent commentators have attracted the
attention of courts in arguing that the historical, legal, and constitutional justifications for
qualified immunity do not justify its existence as a judicially-created doctrine. William
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45 (2018); Stephen R.
Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The
Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 1219, 1244–50 (2015). See also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This unwarranted summary reversal [of summary judgment
in favor of the injured plaintiff] is symptomatic of a disturbing trend regarding the use of
this Court’s resources in qualified-immunity cases. As I have previously noted, this Court
routinely displays an unflinching willingness to summarily reverse courts for wrongly
denying officers the protection of qualified immunity but rarely intervene[s] where courts
wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases. Such a
one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield
for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.”)
(internal citations omitted); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity for executive
officials, however, we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the
statute . . . . Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop
against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in interpret[ing]
the intent of Congress in enacting the Act. Our qualified immunity precedents instead
represent precisely the sort of ‘freewheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously
disclaimed the power to make.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Article is to point out that, though incompatible with principles of
“government speech,” concluding university-owned intellectual
property creates a “limited public forum” for students’ use is not
such a clear answer, even if it is ultimately proper to treat it as such
for purposes of protecting vulnerable student speech from
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First
Amendment.
This Article examines the Gerlich decision and elaborates on
the complexities that arise when analyzing student speech rights,
when such speech competes with, or even conflicts with, university
interests.14 Specifically, this Article will review the court’s oversimplification of the rights and interests at stake in the original
opinion, and more thoroughly scrutinize the intricacies of student
speech rights on university campuses—particularly in the area of
university intellectual property.15 Though the Eighth Circuit’s
ruling upon rehearing provides a more academically rigorous
analysis than the original panel opinion, it nevertheless misses the
analytical mark and fails to fully evaluate the student speech rights
at stake. In Part I, this Article lays out the factual background and
the interests of both sides upon which the Gerlich decision is
rooted.16 Part II discusses the nuanced tensions that exist when
examining First Amendment rights in the setting of a higher
education institution—namely, that such circumstances present
unique instances of “mixed speech,” where both the university and
its students are expressing a message particular to their own
interests.17 Part III analyzes both parties’ respective arguments in
light of these complexities.18 This Article concludes that the issue
14

See discussion infra Parts I, II.
See id.
16
See discussion infra Part I.
17
See generally infra Part II. “Mixed speech” consists of instances of expressive
activity that captures the interests—and implicates the rights—of both private and
government actors. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both
Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 627–40 (2008) (identifying five
factors by which the category of “mixed speech” should be recognized: (1) the identity of
the literal speaker; (2) the person or entity that controls the message; (3) the source of
funding for the expression; (4) the “speech goal”; and (5) the party to whom a reasonable
person would attribute the speech).
18
See discussion infra Part III.
15
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of university trademarks and student speech rights is much more
nuanced than the Eighth Circuit has made it out to be—it is very
much not clearly established law. The underlying problem in
student free speech cases—which the Gerlich decision exemplifies
particularly well—is that courts tend to view university First
Amendment cases in a binary system: public university speech
versus private student speech, emphasizing one to the exclusion of
the other.19 Finally, Part IV lays out several points that courts
should consider in future First Amendment litigation in the higher
education setting, and recommends preventative steps that
universities can take to limit their liability from First Amendment
violation allegations in light of the Gerlich decision.20
Student speech rights do not end at the schoolhouse gates, but
it remains to be seen exactly how far they extend into the daily
operations of a public university. This paper argues that the
Gerlich decision would suggest that they are fairly invasive, and
growing. But for reasons discussed below, there is reason to
question the strength of the Gerlich opinion.21 The relevant
question is not whether student speech rights should be curtailed
on university campuses, but rather, to what extent student speech
rights should prevail when they compete with—or conflict with—
the expressive interests of the university.22

19
See infra Part II (describing how established First Amendment doctrines gloss over
instances where a multiplicity of expressive interests are at stake, especially when applied
in the higher education context); see also infra Part III (analyzing how the arguments
advanced on both sides of the Gerlich decision implicate the same problems and similarly
demonstrate mixed speech issues that require careful resolution).
20
See generally infra Part IV.
21
See infra Parts III & IV (contrasting the private speech forum analysis with
government speech analysis and concluding neither adequately describes or considers the
expressive interests at stake in Gerlich).
22
Brownstein, supra note 6, at 729.
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I. GERLICH V. LEATH
A. Setting the Stage: NORML and Student Advocacy on College
Campuses23
Iowa State University (“ISU”) is a public land grant university
located in Ames, Iowa, enrolling over 35,000 students and
fostering more than 800 officially-recognized student organizations
on its campus.24 One of these organizations is the Iowa Student
Chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws (“NORML”).25 NORML is a nationally-affiliated student
organization that advocates for reforming federal and state
marijuana laws for both recreational and medicinal use.26
ISU made its trademarks available for the use of student
organizations, but requires that designs submitted by groups first
obtain the approval of the university’s Trademark Licensing
Office.27 The Trademark Office, in turn, was responsible for
determining that the student organization’s proposed use of the
trademark complies with ISU’s Guidelines for University
Trademark Use by Student and Campus Organizations.28 As stated
by the Trademark Office, the main goals of ISU’s trademark policy
were to:

23

The facts of Gerlich v. Leath, as discussed in this Article, pertain to those existing at
the time of the incidents underlying the dispute as reflected in the decision before the
district court and on appeal before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
24
Iowa State University Office of the Registrar, Enrollment Statistics, IOWA ST. U.,
http://www.registrar.iastate.edu/enrollment [https://perma.cc/VT3E-9Z7T] (last visited
Oct. 9, 2018).
25
Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2017). See also
Constitution of the Iowa State Chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana
Laws,
ISU
STUDENT
ORGANIZATION
DATABASE,
https://www.stuorg.iastate.edu/site/normlisu [https://perma.cc/2UDP-9E3D] (last visited
Oct. 9, 2018).
26
Constitution of The Iowa State Chapter of the National Organization for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws, supra note 25, at Art. I § 2.
27
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701. See also Iowa State University Trademark Licensing
Office, Trademark Management Policy Statement, IOWA ST. U. (2018),
http://www.policy.iastate.edu/policy/trademark/ [https://perma.cc/5RZD-QAT7].
28
Iowa State University Trademark Licensing Office, supra note 27.
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Promote and protect Iowa State University
through implementation of a management
system, which establishes the means for
consistent, favorable, and professional use of the
Marks;
 Fulfill the legal obligation to protect the Marks;
 Protect the consumer from deception or from
faulty or inferior products and services bearing
the university’s Marks;
 Provide fair and equitable treatment of all
licensees; and
 Realize and distribute earned royalties and other
revenues for the benefit of the university.29
The Guidelines granted student organizations the privilege of
using the marks, but insisted that the designs “appropriately
portray the image of the University” and avoid “the appearance of
a University endorsement.”30 One of ISU’s federally-registered
trademarks is its mascot, “Cy,” the feature of the dispute.31
The Iowa State Chapter of NORML was established as a
student organization on ISU’s campus in October 2012.32 In an
effort to attract members and promote the organization, NORML
promptly submitted a t-shirt design to ISU’s Trademark Office,
seeking permission to use the Cy trademark in its design.33 The tshirts were intended to raise awareness of Iowa marijuana
legislation on ISU’s campus and promote the student
organization.34 This first design submitted by NORML had
“NORML ISU” on the front with the “O” replaced by an image of
Cy.35 The back of the shirt contained a line that read, “Freedom is

29

Id.
Brief for Appellant at 4, Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich II), 847 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16–1518) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
31
Id. at 3.
32
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701.
33
Id. at 701–03.
34
Brief for Appellee at 2–4, Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich II), 847 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir.
2017) (No. 16–1518), 2016 WL 2865243 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
35
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701.
30
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NORML at ISU,” accompanied by a small cannabis leaf.36 The
ISU Trademark Office approved this proposed design for use of
ISU’s trademark on NORML’s t-shirt order several days later.37
On November 19, 2012, the Des Moines Register published an
article discussing the marijuana legalization referenda in Colorado
and Washington while drawing attention to advocacy efforts by
organizations like NORML to similarly change Iowa’s marijuana
laws.38 The article, quoting several members of NORML’s student
leadership, stated that NORML received “nothing but support from
the university.”39 The article went on to examine the student
organization’s efforts on ISU’s campus, and surveyed various
policy opinions regarding medical marijuana.40
After the article was published, ISU claimed to receive
immediate communication from members of the public expressing
concern that the design suggested that the university endorsed
NORML’s political and legislative agenda.41 More concerning, the
university said, was the implication that the student organization
was advocating drug use.42 The same day that the article ran in the
Register, ISU received calls from a legislative staffer for the Iowa
House Republican Caucus, as well as an aide for the Governor’s
Office for Drug Control Policy, inquiring as to whether ISU’s
licensing office had approved of and endorsed the use of the
university’s logo for the NORML ISU t-shirt.43 ISU’s President
and his staff reportedly spent the rest of the day dealing with the
“political public relations implications” of the t-shirt design, and
immediately scheduled a meeting with senior administration
officials to address the issue.44
On November 24, 2012, several weeks after the article was
published, NORML requested approval from the Trademark Office
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701–02; Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 3–5.
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701–02; Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 4–5.
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 702–03.
Id. at 702.
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for the use of the same design submitted in October on another
order.45 ISU officials in the Trademark Office denied that request
on December 3, 2012.46 Meeting with the NORML student
leadership, ISU informed the organization that it would not
approve any other designs using images of cannabis leaves
alongside ISU trademarks.47 Officials further instructed NORML
student leadership that the group was required to obtain the
approval of ISU administration, including the Senior Vice
President of the Division of Business & Financial Affairs and
Senior Vice President for Student Affairs, before submitting any
future t-shirt designs to the Trademark Office.48
At the direction of the university president, ISU subsequently
revised its Trademark Guidelines on January 16, 2013.49 The new
guidelines prohibited “designs that suggest promotion of the below
listed items . . . dangerous, illegal or unhealthy products, actions or
behaviors; . . . [or] drugs and drug paraphernalia that are illegal or
unhealthful.”50 ISU officials expressly indicated that this revision
to the Trademark Guidelines “was done as the result of a number
of external comments including interpretations that the t-shirt
developed indicated that Iowa State University supported the
NORMAL ISU advocacy for the reform of marijuana laws.”51
Accordingly, the Trademark Office continued to reject further
design requests by NORML that directly referenced “marijuana” in
picture or text.52 Significantly, however, the ISU Trademark Office
approved several designs that omitted the picture of a cannabis leaf
or explicit mention of marijuana but retained the same views and
agenda of NORML.53
45

Id.
Id. at 703.
47
Id. at 703–04.
48
Id. at 705.
49
Id. at 702–03.
50
Iowa State University Trademark Licensing Office, Guidelines for University
Trademark Use by Student and Campus Organizations, IOWA ST. U. (2018), at 6,
http://www.trademark.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/imported/policy/TM_student.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F84D-BZAJ].
51
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 703 (internal edits omitted).
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
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NORML filed a lawsuit in Iowa state district court, which ISU
later removed to the federal district court in the Southern District
of Iowa.54 The district court granted summary judgment for
NORML, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the denial of use of ISU
trademarks, along with the subsequent change in the university’s
trademark use policy, were “naturally predicated on the political
content of the group’s views,” constituting impermissible
viewpoint discrimination against the organization in violation of
the students’ First Amendment rights.55
B. Appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Throughout litigation, ISU advanced two core concerns: (1) the
consequences of allowing ISU’s trademark to be placed next to an
image of an illegal drug that is recognized as a symbol for illicit
drug use and (2) confusion surrounding the public’s perceived
endorsement of NORML’s political and legislative agenda.56 As
“inherently expressive devices,” ISU urged the court to consider
the expressive implications that occur when its trademark is
associated with message with which it does not agree.57
By contrast, NORML emphasized that endorsement from the
university was exactly what it desired—and was entitled to—as a
recognized student organization on ISU’s campus.58 NORML
further asserted that ISU discriminated against it because of its
views on drug policy reform, in clear violation of First
Amendment case law protecting the students’ right of
association.59 It is noteworthy to point out that the record reflected
that students of NORML intended public confusion, and aimed for
the perception that ISU was endorsing NORML’s message and
political agenda.60

54

Id.
Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich I), 152 F.Supp.3d 1152, 1172 (S.D. Iowa 2016).
56
Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 5–6, 30–31, 34, 36–37, 42–43; see generally
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d 697.
57
Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 33.
58
See Brief of Appellee, supra note 34, at 18–21, 31–36.
59
See id. at 18–21.
60
Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 9.
55
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1. Iowa State University’s Position and the Interests of Higher
Education Institutions
Upon appeal to the Eighth Circuit, ISU’s primary assignment
of error was, first and foremost, that the district court misidentified
and mischaracterized the nature of the speech at issue.61
Specifically, the university argued that ISU, as a long-standing
institution of higher education, had crafted a very particular
message and cultivated a distinct public image through the
selective use of its trademark and emphasized the large role its
trademarks play in promoting ISU’s institutional image as a
welcoming campus and serious academic institution.62 ISU further
impressed the importance of the university to maintain the use of
its trademark:
It is undisputed that ISU’s trademarks are means by which the
University communicates its messages, connects with its
stakeholders, and promotes its brand. ISU uses its trademarks to
attract prospective students, private and governmental support,
new faculty and staff, and to encourage alumni participation and
support. Through decades of effort and careful management, ISU
has built public goodwill into its trademarks, and as a result its
trademarks carry considerable communications and commercial
value.63
In other words, in order for a trademark to accurately and
effectively communicate the university’s message, an institution of
higher education naturally must exercise “careful management and
editorial discretion” regarding the messages and images with
which it is associated.64
As a result of this particularly-crafted message, ISU asserted
that such expressive qualities inherent in a federally-registered
trademark constituted speech of the university itself.65 ISU argued
61

See id. at 33–34.
Id.
63
Id. at 53 (citing In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2017)).
64
Id. at 44.
65
Id. at 29; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 3–10, Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich II),
847 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1518).
62
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that the constitutional issue regarding ISU’s trademark-use policy
for student organizations did not revolve around the viewpoint of
NORML or the political statements expressed on its t-shirts; rather,
it contended that ISU’s trademark itself constituted government
speech by the public university, and as such was beyond the reach
of First Amendment protections.66
Broadly speaking, the government speech doctrine recognizes
that public bodies have expressive interests and produces speech
that is “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a
government message.”67 When the government engages in
expressive activity of its own, as opposed to merely “managing
government property,” forum analysis is inapplicable because the
government itself is speaking rather than providing a “forum”
through which ordinary citizens express themselves.68 The two
seminal cases defining the Government Speech Doctrine are
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum69 and Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.70 In Pleasant Grove City, the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not place
restrictions on the expression undertaken by government entities
themselves because, under First Amendment precedent, “[a]
government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself’ and ‘is entitled
to say what it wishes,’ and to select the views that it wants to
express.”71 The court reasoned that this same principle applied
when the government used private speakers to express a
government-controlled message.72 In Pleasant Grove City, a
religious organization requested permission from the city to erect a
stone monument that contained its own religious tenants and place
it in a park near a similarly-sized monument displaying the Ten
66

Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 30.
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250–51
(2015) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)).
68
Id.
69
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
70
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
71
555 U.S. at 467–68 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 229 (2010)); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
72
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 468 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
67
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Commandments.73 The city rejected the request,74 and the
organization sued, alleging the city violated its First Amendment
rights by discriminating against its viewpoint, since the
municipality had previously erected a monument to the Christian
faith but rejected that of “the Seven Aphorisms of Summum.”75
The Supreme Court concluded the municipality was exercising
a form of government speech when it allowed the placement of
permanent monuments in a city park donated to the city.76 Rather
than opening up the park for private donors to display whatever
monuments they wished, creating a public forum, the city
“effectively controlled” the messages expressed by the monuments
when the municipality gave its “final approval authority” over their
placement in the park.77 Accordingly, the court rejected the
plaintiff-religious organization’s argument that the city violated its
First Amendment rights by discriminating against its expressive
viewpoint when the city declined to grant the organization
permission to place its own monument in the park.78 The city’s
decision, then, was immune from First Amendment scrutiny.79
Pleasant Grove City ultimately established the principle that the
only legal restraints on the government’s speech are the
Establishment Clause and political opposition: “The involvement
of public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation,
or practice. And of course, a government entity is ultimately
‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for
its advocacy.’”80
Building off the foundation for the government speech doctrine
established in Pleasant Grove City, the Walker court held that
73

Id. at 465.
The city explained to the religious organization that its practice was to limit
monuments in the park to those donated to the city that “either (1) directly relate to the
history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the
Pleasant Grove community,” citing safety and aesthetics considerations. Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 472.
77
Id. at 470–72.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2010)).
74
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state-issued, personalized license plates expressed the endorsement
and viewpoint of the government, and were similarly exempt from
First Amendment regulation.81 There, the “Sons of Confederate
Veterans” organization sought to sponsor a specialty license plate
through the State of Texas’ personalized vanity plate program.82
Texas rejected an application for a design featuring the
Confederate battle flag after public comments reflected a large
segment of the population considered the design to be offensive.83
Just like the municipality’s activity with monuments in the park in
Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court held the State of Texas
was engaged in its own expressive conduct rather than “simply
managing government property” because the specialty license
plates were “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a
government message.”84 Relying on the rationale provided in
Pleasant Grove City, the court concluded that the First
Amendment’s application to the government’ expressive activities
in managing a state-sponsored license plate program intended to
convey only its own message, not those of other individuals.85
Thus, the only recourse private individuals can seek against

81

Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248
(2015). The court articulated a three-part test for government speech: whether (1) the
government has a history of using the medium to express its viewpoint to the public; (2)
the medium is often “closely identified in the public mind” with the government; and (3)
the government maintains direct control over the messages conveyed through the
medium. Id. at 2248–49 (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470–71, 473).
82
Id. at 2244–45.
83
Id. at 2245.
84
Id. at 2251 (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 472).
85
“We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate
designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. And we have
recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a
private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. But here,
compelled private speech is not at issue. And just as Texas cannot require [a private
organization] to convey “the State’s ideological message,” [that organization] cannot
force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.” Id. at
2253 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–717, n.15, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977);
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
573, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
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unpopular speech advanced by the government lies in the political
realm.86
Citing Pleasant Grove City and Walker, ISU argued to the
Eighth Circuit that the district court erred in holding that a
university trademark could only constitute government speech to
the extent it conveyed the actual and intentional endorsement of
the university.87 Rather, ISU urged the court to consider the
contrapositive: that government speech also includes choosing not
to speak.88 It would follow, urged ISU, that if universities possess a
right to associate themselves with particular messages, they also
possess a parallel right to disassociate themselves from other
messages.89 Indeed, the Walker Court held that a personalized
license plate promoting the Confederacy, issued by the State of
Texas, expressed an implicit message of state endorsement,90 and
numerous other federal circuit courts have applied the government
speech doctrine to instances of government property that are
arguably far less expressive than a registered trademark.91 Why,
86

“The Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the
public, who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words
and deeds, will reflect its electoral mandate.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246. Indeed, “[t]hat
freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that first and
foremost provides a check on government speech.” Id. at 2245 (citing Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009), and Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys.
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2010).
87
Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 34–35.
88
Id. at 37–38.
89
Id. at 34–35. Indeed, “[s]ince all speech inherently involves choices of what to say
and what to leave unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is
that one who chooses to speak may also decide what not to say.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573
(quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11
(1986)).
90
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573; Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
91
See generally Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015)
(involving advertisement banners placed on the outfield fence of a school baseball
diamond); Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing
approval of budgets for newsletters, mailings, and other mediums of communication like
a website); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008)
(regarding a school district website); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005)
(involving the state selection of environmental science textbooks); Downs v. Los Angeles
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (regarding a high school bulletin
board); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488 (3rd Cir. 1998) (contemplating
university curriculum and classroom materials); Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of
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then, couldn’t a trademarked-mascot not express the implicit
message of official endorsement of the State of Iowa?
2. NORML’s Position and the Interests of University Students
The issue remains that explicitly withholding endorsement of a
student organization’s expressive activities denies a student
organization the sense of legitimacy and credibility derived from
its association with an institution of higher education.92 NORML
conceded that ISU had a right to approve or disapprove the use of
its trademark by student organizations on its campus.93 However,
the group argued that the university could not operate its
Trademark Office so as to explicitly discriminate against one
group on the basis of its political viewpoint and the particular
message it expressed.94 NORML alleged that ISU manipulated its
trademark licensing program specifically to control the expressive
activities of the student organization because it received political
pushback regarding the group’s legislative agenda.95 To the
contrary of ISU’s suggestion, NORML asserted the historical use
of university trademarks by a wide array of politically and
intellectually opposed speakers on campus, along with “the
university’s traditional station in American society . . . reflects [a
university’s] rightful commitment to fostering diverse forms of
civic engagement and intellectual exploration and debate.”96
Indeed, ISU did not purport to endorse—and in fact explicitly
Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing underwriting acknowledgements
by public university radio station.
92
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (“There can be no doubt that denial of
official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges
that [First Amendment] associational right.”).
93
See Brief for Appellee, supra note 34, at 37 (“Defendants claim this is too general a
statement and try to reframe the issue as being whether Plaintiffs have a ‘right to use ISU
marks without limitation.’ But Plaintiffs have never claimed such a ‘right’ and there is no
issue of removing ‘all limitations’ in this case. Rather, this is about Gerlich and
Furleigh’s right to engage in protected speech without suffering discriminatory treatment
or retribution from ISU officials who are trying to curry political favor or avoid a
political backlash. That well-established right is beyond question.” (internal citations
omitted)).
94
See id. at 17–20.
95
See id. at 12–13.
96
Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich I), 152 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1175–76 (S. D. Iowa 2016).
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disclaimed any intent to endorse—NORML’s political agenda; nor
did it express approval of the political message of any other
student organization when authorizing the organization to use its
registered trademark.97 By contrast, denying the use of a
university-owned trademark to one of its student organizations on
the basis of its politically-charged message in a viewpointdiscriminatory way seems fundamentally incompatible with the
role of a university in fostering civic discourse; thus violating the
students’ right to freedom of expression.98
NORML relied on key cases prohibiting viewpoint
discrimination by a university against its student in exercising their
First Amendment free speech and associational rights on university
campuses.99 In Healy v. James,100 for instance, the Supreme Court
found that the university had violated its students’ First
Amendment right to free speech and association by refusing to
grant official recognition to a student organization advocating for
far “left-wing” political views.101 The Healy court concluded
“[t]here can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without
justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that
associational right” implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly,
and petition of the First Amendment.102
97

Id. at 1158 (“The Trademark Office licenses ISU marks to recognized student
organizations that espouse controversial ideas, activities, or lifestyle choices without the
assumption that the University supports or endorses any of those ideas, activities, or
lifestyle choices. Defendants acknowledge that licensing a trademark to a student group
does not mean that ISU takes a position on what the group represents.”).
98
“Appellants not only want an exception that swallows the rule – they want rules to
be obliterated where there are possible exceptions.” Brief for Appellee, supra note 34, at
39.
99
See generally id. at 1 (relying on apposite cases Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972), Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), and Gay
& Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988)).
100
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
101
Id. at 187–88, 192–93 (“The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State,
may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any
group to be abhorrent.”).
102
Id. at 181. The Supreme Court continued: “[The students’] associational interests
also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards and the school
newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in
which new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating
with these students. Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate in the intellectual
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Consistent with the reasoning in Healy, the Supreme Court in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
affirmed the principle that universities serve as a model for
fundamental free speech rights, and cannot discriminate against
their students’ expression on the basis of the students’
viewpoint.103 The Court held in Rosenberger that the university
similarly violated the free speech rights of its students by denying
the funding request of a Christian student newspaper.104 In making
its funding generally available to student organizations, the Court
reasoned that the university had created a limited public forum for
private speech.105 Even though Rosenberger involved the
allocation of university funding, rather than physical meeting space
provided to student groups and community organizations,106 the
Court found the forums analogous and applied the same
requirement of viewpoint-neutrality.107 Accordingly, the Court did
not allow the university in Rosenberger to favor one speaker over
another, based on content, regarding a “space” it had opened up to
use by its students.108 The Court found that such viewpoint-based
discrimination violated the First Amendment rights of the
students.109
give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of
access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty
members, and other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.” Id. at
181–82.
103
515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995).
104
Id. at 845–46.
105
Id. at 829 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 390 (1993)).
106
Cf. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (holding the denial of a church access to school
premises after-hours to exhibit a film series violated the First Amendment free speech
clause).
107
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (“The [Student Activities Fund] is a forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are
applicable.”).
108
Id. at 895–96 (declining to differentiate between physical and intangible “meeting
space” for purposes of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment).
109
Id.; see also id. at 833–34 (“When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. It does not
follow, however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it

2018]

UNIVERSITY TRADEMARKS AND "MIXED SPEECH"

797

Consistent with this line of cases, NORML argued that the
question of viewpoint discrimination by universities had been tried
and settled.110 From a student’s perspective, favoring certain
student organizations over others based on the content of their
message is contrary to a university’s central, historical purpose of
fostering an environment of intellectual maturation and civic
dialogue among its students.111 Ultimately, NORML urged that
universities cannot be allowed to circumvent the prohibitions of
viewpoint discrimination simply because the space they make
available to their students does not resemble traditional, physical
forums of speech.112
3. The Gerlich Decision
The Gerlich ruling was praised by advocates of individual
liberties and students rights groups,113 but also created an anxious
tension with officials and administrators in higher education.114
Affirming the district court’s decision in full, the Court of Appeals
favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers.”) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). The Eighth Circuit applied this
same principle nearly a decade prior to Rosenberger, holding that a public university
could not siphon off funding from a student organization promoting gay rights and
gender equality, simply because the university did not agree with the group’s political
message. See generally Gay & Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.
1988). Similar to Rosenberger, in Gohn the university had made funding generally
available to student groups but denied funding to one advocating for gay rights because it
disagreed with its view on that issue. Id. at 362–65, 367. The university’s denial of
funding violated that student organization’s First Amendment rights because the
university deviated from established funding procedure specifically because of the
group’s viewpoint on gay rights. Id. at 367.
110
See Brief for Appellee supra note 34, at 13–14 (arguing that “Few First Amendment
principles are more clearly established than the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination,
which the Supreme Court has described as “an egregious form of content discrimination.”
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29)).
111
Brief for Appellee, supra note 34, at 14–15.
112
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
113
Marieke Tuthill Beck-Coon, Eighth Circuit reaffirms victory at Iowa State: School
still can’t censor pot legalization T-shirts, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (FIRE)
(June 14, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/eighth-circuit-reaffirms-victory-at-iowa-stateschool-still-cant-censor-pot-legalization-t-shirts/ [https://perma.cc/UT9V-NWNC].
114
See generally Six Top Tips for Your Internal Trademark Licensing Policies, HIGHER
EDUC. LEGAL INSIGHTS (July 27, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=dee82d16-d7a1-43ed-8a4d-289415937c47 [https://perma.cc/3CEN-H5V8].
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for the Eighth Circuit embraced the arguments advanced by
NORML wholeheartedly.115
The federal circuit court disagreed with ISU’s contention that
the university’s trademark licensing regime constituted
government speech for two reasons. First, the court concluded that,
consistent with Rosenberger, the university had “created a limited
public forum” in its administration of its trademark licensing
regime by making “its trademarks available for student
organizations if they abided by certain conditions.”116
The court reasoned that even if the regulation of the use of
ISU’s trademark by student organizations did not actually establish
a limited public forum, ISU did not use its trademark licensing
regime to express itself or communicate any message, and thus
ISU’s trademark could not constitute government speech.117 Under
Walker, the court determined that ISU had not historically used its
trademarks as a medium for its own speech because the university
allowed nearly 800 student organizations to use its trademarks
each year and the record reflected that ISU officials repeatedly
asserted that the university did not intend to communicate any
message to the public through the trademark’s use by student
groups.118 In any event, concluded the Eighth Circuit, the
government speech doctrine could not apply to ISU’s trademark
since it had already established that licensing student organizations
to use university trademarks creates a limited public forum.119 The
Gerlich court uniformly rejected the argument that, through
NORML’s use of ISU’s trademark, the university was engaging in

115

Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 705–10.
Id. at 705 (“A university ‘establish[es] limited public forums by opening property
limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain
subjects.’”) (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the
Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010)).
117
Id. at 707–08.
118
Id. (citing Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2248 (2015)).
119
Id. at 707. This sort of circular reasoning commonly occurs throughout the Gerlich
decision, and helps demonstrate how the Eighth Circuit over-simplified the underlying
Free Speech issue.
116
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expressive activity through its association with and implied
endorsement of the student group’s message.120
The Eighth Circuit concluded by reprimanding the university’s
senior leadership for their actions against the students of NORML,
stating that “[t]he record is also replete with statements from
defendants regarding their political motives.”121 In fact, the court
publicly condemned ISU officials for undermining the institution’s
core function—preparing students for civic engagement and
democratic participation as citizens—when it implied that the
students of NORML were not contributing to the free exchange of
dialogue on campus by advocating for legislative change in Iowa
marijuana laws.122 As such, the court found that this publicity and
political attention ISU’s trademark received when associated with
NORML’s t-shirt design played a direct and controlling role in its
decision to censor the student group’s use of its trademark moving
forward, constituting impermissible viewpoint discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.123
In a concurring opinion upon rehearing by the panel, Judge
Jane Kelly articulated a more pointed rebuke to the arguments
offered by ISU. “In at least four cases the Supreme Court has held
that a university creates a limited public forum when it distributes
benefits to recognized student groups . . . . These factually
analogous precedents are no less apposite simply because the court
cites no case addressing a trademark licensing program.”124 Judge
Kelly convincingly points out that ISU’s purported reason for
denying NORML the trademark use does not stand up to close
120

Id. at 706; see also id. at 712–15 (Kelly, J., concurring).
Id. at 706.
122
“Hill stated in an interview with the Ames Tribune that the reason student groups
associated with political parties could use ISU’s logos, but groups like NORML ISU may
not, is because ‘[w]e encourage students to be involved in their duties as a citizen.’ Such
a statement implies that Hill believed that the members of NORML ISU were not
undertaking their duties as citizens by advocating for a change in the law.” Id.
123
Id. at 708–10.
124
Id. at 710–11 (citing Christian Legal Soc. Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 1, 679, 685(2010)); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
(1981)); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972); Gay and Lesbian Students Ass’n
v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1988).
121
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scrutiny.125 If ISU’s rationale holds true, ISU presumably would
have rejected the t-shirt design the first time, when it was initially
proposed.126 Indeed, “[p]articipants in a [limited public] forum,
declared open to speech ex ante, may not be censored ex post when
the sponsor decides that particular speech is unwelcome.”127
Ultimately, the court held university officials certainly would
have—or should have—known that denying access to a channel of
speech after receiving negative reviews based on the message
conveyed would not be a permissible exercise of viewpoint
discrimination, even if such concerns were legitimate.128
II. THE “MIXED-SPEECH” DILEMMA IN STUDENT EXPRESSION ON
COLLEGE CAMPUSES
Issues that accompany student speech occurring on the
campuses of higher education institutions are incredibly
complicated. Despite the ease by which the Gerlich Court reached
its conclusion, the surrounding case law is far from being “clearly
established.” In truth, such speech often implicates First
Amendment interests of multiple parties on campus and can be
best understood as “mixed speech”—speech that bears expressive
qualities and consequential interests of both students and the
university.129 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the
development of its First Amendment jurisprudence in recent years
has left the doctrinal framework uncertain and nearly
unnavigable.130 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts sarcastically
remarked during the oral argument of a recent school speech case,

125

See generally infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 714 (Kelly, J., concurring).
127
Id. at 715 (Kelly, J., concurring) (quoting Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 737 (7th
Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added).
128
Id. at 709; id. at 714–15 (Kelly, J., concurring). See also Cornelius v. NAACP, 473
U.S. 788, 811 (1985) (“The existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a
nonpublic forum . . . will not save a regulation that is in reality a façade for viewpointbased discrimination.”).
129
Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 234 (2013).
130
See id. at 214–15 n.19.
126

2018]

UNIVERSITY TRADEMARKS AND "MIXED SPEECH"

801

Morse v. Frederick,131 how complex even the preliminary question
of determining the speaker and analyzing the expression, let alone
characterizing the forum itself, can be.132
Evaluating a free speech claim against a university presents a
number of issues complicating traditional First Amendment forum
analysis. Determining the “speaker,” first and foremost, presents
the greatest challenge. But even with this hurdle cleared, deciding
in what context, or forum, to analyze the speech at issue is
similarly unclear. Finally, considering the university’s interest in
the speech, as it relates to the institution’s mission and reputation,
confronts the question of how the university’s imprimatur is
implicated and whether or not this matters constitutionally. Taken
together, it becomes less clear who the “speaker” is in mixedspeech cases for purposes of adjudicating First Amendment
131

551 U.S. 393 (2007).
“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think the law was clearly established when this
happened that the principal, that the instant that the banner was unfurled, snowballs are
flying around, the torch is coming, should have said oh, I remember under Tinker I can
only take the sign down if it’s disruptive. But then under Fraser I can do something if it
interferes with the basic mission, and under Kuhlmeier I’ve got this other thing. So she
should have known at that point that she could not take the banner down, and it was so
clear that she should have to pay out of her own pocket because of it.
MR. MERTZ [counsel for Frederick]: Mr. Chief Justice, there are two different time
points we have to talk about. There’s the heat of the moment out there on the street, but
then later back in the office when she actually decided to levy the punishment after she
had talked to him, after she heard why he did it and why he didn’t do it, after she had had
a chance to consult with the school district’s counsel. At that point in the calmness of her
office, then she should indeed have known it. And she did testify that she had taken a
master’s degree course in school law in which she studied Kuhlmeier and Fraser and
Tinker. So —
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And so it should be perfectly clear to her exactly what she
could and couldn’t do.
MR. MERTZ: Yes.
JUSTICE SCALIA: As it is to us, right? (Laughter.)
JUSTICE SOUTER: I mean, we have a debate here for going on 50 minutes about what
Tinker means, about the proper characterization of the behavior, the nonspeech behavior.
The school’s terms in dealing with the kids that morning. The meaning of that
statement. We’ve been debating this in this courtroom for going on an hour, and it seems
to me however you come out, there is reasonable debate. Should the teacher have known,
even in the, in the calm deliberative atmosphere of the school later, what the correct
answer is?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–50, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618
(2007) (No.
06-278),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/06-278.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J4Q-467C].
132
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disputes between universities and their students, and whose
interests should prevail. The following Parts will address each of
these issues, respectively.
A. Who is the Speaker?
Though it may seem straightforward on its face, determining
who actually owns the speech at issue arguably presents more
problems than it solves.133 In fact, the Supreme Court predicted in
the Pleasant Grove City case that “[t]here may be situations in
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking
on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”134
Public schools and universities, like private entities, are capable of
expression in non-traditional ways that a court should take into
account when analyzing a claim under the Free Speech Clause.
The government can speak in a variety of ways. In general, the
Supreme Court has held that a government entity is capable of
speaking itself, or when adopting the view of a particular private
speaker as its own.135 Furthermore, public universities may
“speak” through the association or promotion of “private
mouthpieces” even when they do not agree with or purport to
endorse that speaker’s viewpoint.136 A university promoting or
associating with a multitude of private speakers, expressing an
array of individual viewpoints, may constitute the university’s
expression in a way that represents a broad, multi-faceted

133

See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 751 (“In the public school context, distinguishing
government speech decisions (which are not reviewed under the Free Speech Clause)
from student speech restrictions in school-sponsored activities (which are reviewed under
Hazelwood) may seem to be a deceptively straightforward task. The key question would
be who is doing the talking.”).
134
Pleasant Grove City v. Summun, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
135
See generally id.; Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2239 (2015); Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. 460.
136
See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect
Storm, 96 GEO. LJ. 1, 55–56 (2007); see, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998);
see generally Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71
(2004).

2018]

UNIVERSITY TRADEMARKS AND "MIXED SPEECH"

803

“viewpoint.”137 State actors at large also engage in their own
speech activity where they exercise editorial discretion in selecting
the expressive material of third parties—“editorial choices” by
public entities are, according to the Supreme Court,
communicative acts.138
For example, one federal appellate court applied Walker and
Pleasant Grove City to find that billboards erected around the
outfield of a public high school’s baseball field constituted
government speech because the banners bore the imprimatur of the
school, and the school exercised “substantial control” over the
messages conveyed by the banners, effectively reserving the right
to speak for itself through individual private actors.139
Consequently, the court held the First Amendment allowed the
137
See Blocher, supra note 136. But see Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech
Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 953, 993–94 (1998) (“Not only must government’s claimed relationship to a
controllable speaker be a legitimate one grounded in government’s interest in the speech
activity itself (rather than welfare payments or construction contracts), but the speech
restrictions must also be voluntary and related to government’s valid expressive purposes
(as employer, policymaker, subsidizer, purchaser, patron). Moreover, government’s
expressive purpose must be explicitly stated, the conditions placed on speakers must be
narrowly adapted to communicating the intended message, and government’s expression
must be additive and participatory, not exclusive and monopolistic.”).
138
Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 679 (“On the other hand, the government
does not create a designated public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility
for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as
individuals, ‘obtain permission.’”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 587–88
(noting that government entities have “wide latitude to set spending priorities” and
“allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were
direct regulation of speech or criminal penalty at stake” without violating the First
Amendment; but acknowledging “a more pressing constitutional question would arise if
Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”). The Forbes Court
distinguished an instance where the public television station, controlled by the state,
chose to invite certain political candidates to a televised debate from the instance in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), where a public university made university
facilities generally available to student organizations but denied access to a group seeking
to use them for religious worship in violation of the First Amendment as a content-based
discrimination.
139
See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“When the government exercises the right to speak for itself, it can freely select the
views that it wants to express. This freedom includes choosing not to speak and speaking
through the . . . removal of speech that the government disapproves.”).
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school to remove the advertisement of a math tutor who doubled as
an adult film actor.140 Instances of curricular speech, expressed by
students themselves, can also constitute speech by the
university.141 Under the current Free Speech jurisprudence
analyzing editorial choices in a teacher’s curriculum,142
government speech could conceivably encompass instances where
a teacher assigns a student to read his or her history report to the
rest of the class, or where school rules state that funding for a
student newspaper may be used to express only the messages that
the university wants to communicate.143
However, as the Gerlich court points out, these instances of a
university speaking itself, or speaking through private actors, are
distinguishable from a university merely facilitating the speech of
private parties.144 In this latter category, universities may not
discriminate based on viewpoint because the speech is associated
more with the individual student than it is with the university.145
When facilitating the association and expression of student
organizations through official recognition or budgetary allocations,
universities may not deny expressive opportunity on the basis of a
particular group’s viewpoint, message, or political ideology.146
140

See id. (“Because characterizing speech as government speech ‘strips it of all First
Amendment protection’ under the Free Speech Clause, we do not do so lightly.”)
(quoting Walker v. Tex Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2255
(2015)) (Alito, J., dissenting).
141
See also Brownstein, supra note 6, at 736–37, 750, 769 (“By analogy, student
speech that is part of a curricular activity may also constitute government speech.”).
142
See, e.g., Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir.
2007); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 2005); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch.
Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n,
523 U.S. at 674 (reasoning in dicta that “public school prescribing its curriculum” is not
subject to the restraints of the Free Speech Clause).
143
Brownstein, supra note 6, at 736.
144
See Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 709 (8th Cir. 2017).
145
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
(citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–72 (1988)).
146
See id. at 833–34 (“When the government disburses public funds to private entities
to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure
that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. It does not follow,
however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper
when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors
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Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Widmar v. Vincent147
explicitly forbids viewpoint discrimination in university
accommodations of expression.148 The Widmar Court held that
where a public university makes its campus facilities generally
available to student groups for expressive purposes, it may not
deny access based on the group’s content or viewpoint.149
While many courts determine whether a particular instance
constitutes university or student speech on an ad hoc basis,150 only
rarely do they more thoroughly examine the nature of the particular
expression at issue.151 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1152 is one
occasion of a school-related speech dispute where a court took
advantage of the opportunity to do so. That case involved an art
initiative at a public elementary school, inviting students, parents,
and community members to paint tiles that would be placed around
the campus.153 The tiles had to conform to certain guidelines and

but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. A
holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private
persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is
controlled by different principles.”) (internal citations omitted); Gay & Lesbian Students
Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Nat’l Endowment for Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing constitutional question would arise
if Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated
to drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”) (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
147
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
148
Id. (“[W]e affirm the continuing validity of cases, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at
188–89, that recognize a University’s right to exclude even First Amendment activities
that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education.”).
149
Id. (“Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates
the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and
the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.”).
150
Brownstein, supra note 6, at 750.
151
Id. at 757–58 (noting the different approaches taken by courts to resolve speechrelated issues in public schools, but ultimately concluding that the case law reflects “a
muddled lack of clarity about the relationship between these overlapping frameworks”).
152
298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002).
153
Id. at 920–22.
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were subject to the approval of the school administration.154 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals fashioned its own analysis to
determine the nature of the speech, asking: (1) whether the central
purpose was to promote views of the school or private speaker; (2)
whether the school exercised editorial control over the speech
content; (3) whether the school was the literal speaker; and (4)
whether ultimate responsibility for the speech rested with the
school.155 Based on these factors, the Tenth Circuit ultimately
concluded that the tiles did not represent school speech, but instead
were school-sponsored speech upon which the school could
properly place viewpoint-oriented restrictions when related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.156 Such a searching inquiry,
however, is rare.
Courts, along with most scholars, are loath to attribute speech
to a university.157 This hesitancy is with good reason. By
classifying the expression as pure “government speech,” the
expression is essentially exempted from First Amendment
scrutiny.158 Doing so removes any First Amendment protections
from students implicated with the speech and negates their
154

Id. at 920.
Id. at 923.
156
Id. at 924 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)).
157
See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 17, at 662–671 (noting that classifying instances of
competing “mixed speech” between student and university interests “lessens the
likelihood that the government will be held accountable for its advocacy” and “distorts
the marketplace of ideas by making some viewpoints seem more popular than they
actually are”); Bowman, supra note 129, at 283 (arguing that in all instances except
teachers’ instructional classroom speech, “the government speech doctrine either is not a
fit at a fundamental level, or it undermines one or both of the public goods so
substantially that applying it to that category of cases is indefensible”). Other scholars
embrace the government speech doctrine, but, recognizing its implications, propose more
stringent requirements on its application. See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and
Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 698, 706–19 (2011) (advocating for the
application of the government speech doctrine “when the government establishes itself as
the source of the contested speech both formally and functionally – i.e., where the
government claims the speech as its own when it authorizes the express, and where
onlookers understand that expression to be the government’s at the time of its delivery”).
158
See infra Part IV.2 (examining the viability of the government speech doctrine in
university free speech cases); See also Walker v. Tex Div., Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246–48 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009).
155
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interests entirely.159 Such a result is problematic because in an
instant the students’ interest in the speech is all but obliterated,
giving the university carte blanche authority to censor speech
occurring on its campus based on whatever interest it has at
stake.160
In fact, attempting to determine whether the speech belongs
exclusively to the university or its students is, in large part, a false
choice. Viewing speech in this binary is of little use in instances,
such as Gerlich, where both parties seem to be speaking (or at least
have
independent
interests
in
expression’s
content)
simultaneously.161 Indeed, it is convenient—and more
appropriate—to imagine “mixed speech” in the higher education
setting as existing on a continuum: pure university speech and its
interest in protecting its imprimatur on one hand and speech
attributable solely to students and student organizations on
the other.162
159

See Randall Bezanson & William Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1429 (2001) (“Government speech cannot logically be made a
function of the office of the person making an allocation decision. That approach would
elevate form over substance and would enable the government to dictate the First
Amendment result simply by manipulating the agency in the decision-making process.”).
160
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately, the Court’s
decision categorizes private speech as government speech and thus strips it of all First
Amendment protection.”).
161
See Lyrissa Lidski, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2011–12 (2011);
Bowman, supra note 129, at 234–35 & nn.124–27.
162
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 607 (2008) (“The trouble with this dichotomy is
that not all speech is purely private or purely governmental. In fact, much speech is the
joint production of both government and private speakers and exists somewhere along a
continuum, with pure private speech and pure government speech at each end.”); Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1358–59 (2001)
(“Between the extremes of private speech and government speech lies the vast middle
ground of government/private speech interaction,” describing subsidies of private speech
of private actors); Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting
the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2004) (“But
sometimes speech may most accurately be described as simultaneously belonging both to
government and to private individuals or groups. This is often the case when a public
actor offers private speakers an expressive opportunity that is especially attractive
because it appears to carry some indication of government endorsement or imprimatur.
Recognizing that public and private entities sometimes speak jointly may help us sort
through some of these hard cases.”).
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Yet Courts have consistently (and, quite easily) dismissed
universities’ interests in its students’ speech by relying on such a
university-student binary, viewing the case as a purely government
speech case or a purely private speech case.163 Further, they
routinely fail to consider the possibility that universities may have
an interest in the expression.164 Instances of co-existent interests in
the content of expressive activity, like Gerlich, likely fall
somewhere in the middle between the two ends of the spectrum.
Though some commentators have gone so far as to consider an
entirely new speech category,165 few have actually engaged in this
sort of inquiry, and most continue to rely on this public-private
binary.166 As aptly put by one scholar,
[I]f mixed speech is categorized as private speech, the
government cannot discriminate against any viewpoints.
Consequently, discounting the government component of mixed
speech may lead to government endorsement of undesirable
messages (like offensive or hate speech) or government
endorsement of religious messages in violation of the
establishment clause . . . . [I]f mixed speech is categorized as
government speech, the government may censor viewpoints.
Viewpoint discrimination, however, may undermine the free
speech interests of both speakers and audiences and distort the
marketplace of ideas. Furthermore . . . the government’s chosen
viewpoint could be mistaken for private preferences. The resulting
163
Bowman, supra note 129, at 278; See also id. at 280 & n.371 (“Even what is the
closest call [on the university and student speech continuum]—the speech of student
organizations, which arguably could be classified as mixed speech between the
organization and the school whose name it uses—consistently has been classified by
courts as purely student, nonmixed speech.”) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)).
164
See Norton, supra note 162, at 1330.
165
See generally Brownstein, supra note 6. Brownstein advocates for the creation of a
whole new forum, the “nonforum,” where (1) government property and activities that are
pervasively expressive in nature and serve intrinsically expressive functions; (2)
circumstances where notions of federalism and separations of powers should preclude
intrusive judicial review of speech regulations; and (3) the expressive activity reasonably
bears the imprimatur of the state. Id. at 784.
166
See Bowman, supra note 129, at 235.
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lack of transparency permits the government to advance its policy
positions without being held accountable for its advocacy.167
However, if courts care to examine the mutual, co-existent
interests involved in instances of mixed speech on college
campuses, “this recognition would more accurately describe the
speech itself.”168
In sum, public universities are capable of expressive activity as
government actors either by speaking themselves or endorsing
private speakers to serve as their mouthpieces for views they
endorse. Identifying the true “speaker” in cases of student speech
on college campuses is rarely as straightforward as it seems, and a
more rigorous inquiry by courts is needed on this front.
B. What is the Forum?
The difficulties in evaluating free speech claims on university
campuses do not stop after determining the speaker(s) in a given
case. “Mixed-speech” issues on university campuses are more
complicated than simply determining who is speaking, and hastily
basing decisions solely off the speaker’s identity can create even
more analytical problems.169 Another embedded issue is evaluating
the forum in which the speech is occurring.
The type of forum in which the expression is made is a critical
element to effectively assessing the rights of the speaker(s) and
determining the permissible restrictions, if any, a university may
put in place. More specifically, the purpose for which the forum

167

See Corbin, supra note 162, at 608, 610.
Bowman, supra note 129, at 236. But see R. George Wright, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175,
197–98 (2007) (“The law seeks to distinguish between speech by some party that is
apparently or actually approved by the school from speech by the school itself, made
officially on behalf of the school by an authorized agent of the school. At its simplest,
then, the law seeks to distinguish between nonpublic forum speech that the school merely
somehow approves or sponsors, and official speech on behalf of the school itself by its
agents. The distinction between speech in a nonpublic forum that the school somehow
sponsors and speech by or officially in the name of the school is inevitably vague, if it is
tenable at all. We should therefore be reluctant to try to impose radically different free
speech tests on such only hazily distinguishable categories.”).
169
See Brownstein, supra note 6 at 751.
168
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was created is highly significant.170 Some scholars have opined
that the results reached in free speech cases occurring on university
campuses are often inconsistent, if not wrong, largely because of
the reviewing court’s preliminary articulation of the forum at
issue.171 In other words, the way that a court classifies the context
of the expression itself colors the free speech analysis because it
often turns out to be inconsistent with, unreasonably interfere with,
or fail to account for the forum’s actual stated purpose or intended
use.172 Alternatively, examining the forum’s purpose may
complicate identifying who the true speaker is or, if there are
several speakers, recognizing all of the expressive interests at
stake. If the university’s intent is to open the forum for different
students as private speakers to express their own views, then a
court can more easily attribute the speech to those students.173 By
contrast, if the forum’s purpose, evidenced by the university’s
intent, is to combine a number of select messages that represents
the university’s own viewpoint or even speak for itself, then the
speech more closely reflects the expression of the public university
and can be treated as such.174
Further, some First Amendment scholars have identified the
government speech doctrine itself as a separate forum.175 Rather
170

See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
(“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity . . . The touchstone for evaluating
these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum
at issue serves.”); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 688–90 (2010).
171
See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 6, at 717–18, 721–23.
172
See id.
173
See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
174
See generally Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
175
Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. L. REV. 809,
811 (2010). See also Bezanson & Buss, The Manner Faces of Government Speech, supra
note 159, at 1406 (“In its most primitive form, the doctrine created a very nice
compromise: it opened up government property for a constitutionally favored activity –
the exercise of the freedom of speech—at minimal cost, given that speech in traditional
public forums burdened the government’s ordinary use of its property very little.”).
Although not stated quite so explicitly, Brownstein essentially suggests the same thing in
his call to doctrinally establish his vision of the “nonforum.” See Brownstein, supra note
6, at 785 (“The secondary thesis of this Part of the Article is that school-sponsored
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than merely protecting the government’s ability to speak, “[the
government speech doctrine] grants the government a forum for its
expression that can span time, place, and space, and in which only
ideas it favors may be spoken, and other ideas with which the
government would ordinarily have to compete may be
excluded.”176 This, again, alters the identification of who the owner
of the expressive activity really is in a mixed speech case. Others
still have gone so far as to argue that forum analysis is outright
inapplicable when the government has an expressive interest; that
if a university is speaking at all, in any expressive capacity, forum
analysis becomes inappropriate because it ignores the interest in
speech that is “arguably at least partially that of the school.”177
Just as misidentifying the speaker can lead a court to analyze
an incomplete picture of speech occurring on college campuses, so
too does glossing over the identity of the forum in which the
expression is occurring. As described above, this colors the
analysis of free speech rights, even affecting the earlier
identification of who the speaker is. Court analyzing First
Amendment cases in the university setting must carefully identify
the forum in which the speech at issue is occurring so as to
examine the speech in light of the purpose of that forum.
C. University Imprimatur and Educational Mission
Even if an instance of mixed speech is properly understood to
weigh more on the side of private speech by a student, institutions
of higher education retain a strong interest in exercising some sort
of control over its content.178 The associational properties of a
student’s viewpoint ties the expression to the institution and
implicates its imprimatur.179 Indeed, courts have supported the
notion that public elementary schools have an interest in
activities constitute a nonforum, and as such, government control of student speech in
such activities should be shielded from free speech scrutiny.”).
176
Bezanson, supra note 175, at 811.
177
See Bowman, supra note 129, at 237–38, 276–78.
178
“Private speech bearing the imprimatur of a school or of the state is problematic for
a different reason. It creates a real risk that the content of private messages will be
misattributed to government.” Brownstein, supra note 6, at 798.
179
Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271, 281 (1988).
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disassociating themselves from curricular speech that is
inconsistent with the school’s “shared values of civilized order” or
“associate[s] the school with any position other than neutrality on
matters of political controversy.”180 The Supreme Court in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier recognized that public
elementary schools may censor or otherwise exercise “editorial
control” over student speech that could be reasonably perceived to
bear the imprimatur of the school, so long as the restrictions are
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”181
Hazelwood’s holding was confined to the kindergarten to twelfth
grade setting and the Court has not yet applied it to the higher
education context;182 however, numerous federal circuit courts of
appeal have analyzed Hazelwood and concluded that imprimatur
concept does—or should—extend to the university level.183
Though the concept of university imprimatur has largely been
decided in cases involving school curricular activities,184 there
seems to be little reason not to extend this principle to extracurricular speech as well.185 Many courts already justify applying
180

Frank LoMonte, “The Key Word is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the
Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 317 (2013) (quoting Hazelwood, 262
U.S. at 271–72).
181
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
182
Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification
Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 383 (2013) (arguing that a modified form of
Hazelwood’s imprimatur rule should be applied to the unique situations presented in
“certification cases” at the university level).
183
See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011); Ward v.
Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012); Axon-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289
(10th Cir. 2004).
184
See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260.
185
The language defining the contours of Hazelwood is very broad. Justice White,
writing for the majority, explained that school-sponsored activities “may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.” Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 271; see also Brownstein, supra note 6, at 763; Bowman, supra note 129, at
275–78. But cf. Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 715 n.8 (8th Cir. 2017)
(Kelly, J., concurring) (stating the opposing viewpoint that Hazelwood is limited to
instances “supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge
or skills to student participants and audiences”) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271);
LoMonte, supra note 180, at 362 (“Although Hazelwood did not deprive students of all
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Hazelwood’s principles to speech occurring well outside of the
curricular setting.186 Indeed, the notion that learning outside the
classroom is not new—involvement with student organizations and
other extra-curricular activities still serves the purposes and
pedagogical goals of higher education institutions by encouraging
intellectual growth and maturation.187
Even when not bearing the direct imprimatur of the educational
institution, schools may restrict speech that is—or is perceived to
be—inconsistent with its educational mission. The Supreme Court
in Morse v. Frederick188 decided that it did not violate students’
First Amendment rights to be restricted in wielding a banner at a
school-sponsored rally that said “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”189 The Court
found that because the message could reasonably be construed to
endorse the use of illegal drugs, in violation of school policy, the
school had a special interest in disassociation from such speech in
the educational setting, even where the rally occurred outside of
the curriculum.190 Though the school’s imprimatur was not directly
implicated, because no “reasonable” observer would perceive the
students’ speech as bearing the school’s endorsement, Morse
First Amendment protection—the burden remains on the government to come forward
with a justification “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”—in practice,
the Hazelwood standard has become a virtual rubber stamp for whatever excuse for
censorship a school can muster.”).
186
Brownstein, supra note 6, at 763–65, 769 n.170, 818 n.285.
187
E.g. Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 825
(9th Cir. 1991) (“High schools foster learning experiences inside and outside the
classroom and serve pedagogical as well as in locus parenti purposes.”); see also Brad
Dickens, Reclaiming Hazelwood: Public School Classrooms and Return to the Supreme
Court’s Vision for Viewpoint-Specific Speech Regulation Policy,16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT.
529, 549 (2013) (concluding that the Supreme Court intended Hazelwood to apply in
narrow instances where schools must have complete control over “speech that appears to
be the official voice and opinion of the school and ultimately the government”;
necessarily, “[v]iewpoint neutrality simply has no place within an accurate reading of
Hazelwood”).
188
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
189
Id. at 400.
190
See id. at 408 (“The “special characteristics of the school environment and the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse—reflected in the policies of
Congress and myriad school boards, including JDHS—allow schools to restrict student
expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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supports the notion that at least some viewpoint discrimination in
the education setting is permissible when it implicates core
concerns of a school’s educational mission.191
However, the Supreme Court has also noted that “[t]he
proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to
censor is not complicated.”192 Indeed, the private speech at issue
must be somehow attributable to the university, or its core
educational mission, for it to bear the imprimatur of the school.193
Nevertheless, Hazelwood has been applied in instances where the
speech at issue cannot reasonably be attributed to or mistaken for
endorsement by the educational institution, often in an effort by
courts to reconcile the institution’s interest in the speech with the
students’ own expressive rights.194 Though, whether the speech at
issue bears the imprimatur of the school is a prime point of
contention among judges and scholars alike,195 and failing to
191

See LoMonte, supra note 180, at 307 & n.14.
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
193
Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (concluding
that “the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech” “concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to
student participants and audiences.”) with Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)
(“Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe that [the
student’s] banner [advocating drug use] bore the school’s imprimatur.”).
194
Le Monde, supra note 180, at 320–21 (“Courts have applied Hazelwood even where
no reasonable listener would confuse the individual speech for the officially sanctioned
word of the school.”); see, e.g., C.H. v. Olivia, 226 F.3d 198, 213 (3rd Cir. 2000) (en
banc); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1984); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. Palm Beach
Cty., 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004).
195
“While Hazelwood certainly applies to many things that occur in the classroom . . .
nothing in Hazelwood suggests that its standard applies when a student is called upon to
express his or her personal views in class or in an assignment. On the contrary,
Hazelwood governs only those expressive activities that might reasonably be perceived
‘to bear the imprimatur of the school.’ . . . Things that students express in class or in
assignments when called upon to express their own views do not ‘bear the imprimatur of
the school’ . . . and do not represent ‘the [school’s] own speech.’” Olivia, 226 F.3d 198,
213–14 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
271; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
192
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recognize this tension completely ignores a university’s competing
interest in the speech on its campus.196
Even where instances of mixed speech on college campuses
can most reasonably be attributed to student-based speakers, there
are instances, described above, where that private speech
nevertheless implicates the imprimatur and implicit endorsement
of the university. To fully analyze the speech rights at issue, a
reviewing court should be cognizant of if and how studentdominant speech can bear expressive qualities of the university
with which the student affiliates.
III. ANALYSIS: DARKENING THE MUDDIED WATERS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
After exploring the complexities of mixed speech instances on
college campuses, it is more than apparent that there is no easily
navigable analysis. The lack of coherent doctrinal framework has
frustrated constitutional law scholars and judges alike, while
further imposing hardships on higher education institutions in
negotiating how they decide to respect expressive activities
occurring on campus.
Yet courts, like the Eighth Circuit in Gerlich, continue to
resolve free speech disputes between students and their university
without engaging with the nuances examined above in any
meaningful way.197 The issues surrounding the speech interests in
Gerlich are much more nuanced—and have much greater
ramifications—than the Eighth Circuit’s ruling reflects. While the
Gerlich Court was likely correct in its ultimate conclusion—that
post hoc viewpoint discrimination runs counter to fundamental
principles embodied in the First Amendment198—it nevertheless
196

See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 798 (“Private speech bearing the imprimatur of a
school or of the state is problematic for a different reason. It creates a real risk that the
content of private messages will be misattributed to government.”).
197
See infra Part II, and accompanying discussion. See also Corbin, supra note 17, at
672 (noting the inconsistent approaches the Supreme Court, and lower courts, have taken
to analyze cases that present the dilemma of “mixed speech”).
198
Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 705 (8th Cir. 2017). Indeed, “[c]onduct
may be prohibited or regulated, within broad limits. But government may not
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misses the analytical mark in its forum analysis. At the same time,
neither the position advanced by ISU,199 nor that of NORML,200
successfully articulates the intricacies of First Amendment
jurisprudence in the university setting or properly resolves their
conflicting expressive interests. As discussed below, the Gerlich
decision summarily dismisses the complexity of mixed speech
instances on college campuses and declines to acknowledge the
inherent interest that higher education institutions have in the use
of their intellectual property by student organizations. In short, the
court could have been reached the same conclusion with a more
rigorous free speech analysis examining the full spectrum of
expressive interests at stake in this instance of “mixed speech.”
The following Parts will examine each position in turn.
A. Viability of the Government Speech Doctrine
First and foremost, the Gerlich Court too quickly and
summarily dismissed the expressive qualities of ISU’s trademark
and the university’s interest in student groups’, like NORML, use
of its intellectual property. Instead of engaging in a meaningful
discussion of the points raised by the university, the Court assumed
the trademark constituted a limited public forum and summarily
concluded “[t]he government speech doctrine does not apply if a
government entity has created a limited public forum for
speech.”201 This circular logic is at odds with a comprehensive
analysis of instances of mixed speech and demonstrates how courts
can come to predetermined conclusions when the identity of the
speaker and nature of the forum are glossed over without a more
searching inquiry about the character of the expression in
question.202
discriminate against people because it dislikes their ideas, not even when the ideas
include advocating that certain conduct now criminal be legalized.” Gay and Lesbian
Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1988).
199
See generally supra Part I.B.1 (laying out the arguments advanced on appeal by
ISU).
200
See generally supra Part I.B.2 (laying out the arguments advanced on appeal by
NORML).
201
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 707.
202
See supra Parts II.A–B.
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The principles behind the government speech doctrine are
certainly important to consider when analyzing instances of
“mixed speech,” as in the present case. In some instances, it could
be possible to treat mixed speech as if it were government
speech.203 Universities do, and should, have the ability to
selectively license their trademarks. At the very least, account
should be taken for when a university’s imprimatur is implicated;
even as an institution of higher education, ISU should be able to
disassociate itself from matters of political controversy and express
neutrality on matters occurring within the curriculum.204 As
discussed above, there are at least some compelling reasons to
extend this rationale to extra-curricular speech that serves
pedagogical goals as well.205 If trademarks are in fact inherently
expressive devices, then the Gerlich court erred in wholly ignoring
the fact that ISU in some way retains expressive interests by
licensing its trademarks to student organizations.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit appropriately declined to rule
that the trademark constituted government speech. The
consequences of classifying ISU’s trademark as government
speech ultimately outweigh its utility to ISU; the doctrine is
inconsistent with the applicable First Amendment jurisprudence
regarding speech rights on college campuses. If the government
speech doctrine were to apply to ISU’s trademark, then student
groups denied access to its use would be entirely cut off from any
redress by courts, as the trademark would be exempt from First
Amendment protection.206 What would stop a university like ISU
from only allowing its trademark to be used by student
organizations with conservative (or, vice-versa, liberal)
ideologies?207 If the university’s aim is to “speak” in support of
203

See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 789.
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988).
205
See supra Part III.C; Bowman, supra note 129, at 276–78.
206
Bowman, supra note 129, at 230.
207
The need to guard against partisan restrictions on speech has long been recognized
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (“The
college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’
and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to
safeguarding academic freedom.”).
204
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these viewpoints and adopt them to be recognized as its own, to the
exclusion of contrary views, the parallels to blatant viewpoint
suppression surrounding cases like Healy and Rosenberger are
clear. On the other hand, if the university’s goal in licensing its
trademark to student groups is to achieve a “diversity of views” to
represent it, then the university is not really achieving its own goal.
Further still, application of the government speech doctrine to
the facts of Gerlich undermines the rationale on which university
control of its own speech is based. If the government speech
doctrine is premised on the idea that public entities should be able
to control their own message,208 then a university should not be
able to censure certain speech just because it is not aligned with its
expressive interest; rather, censorship may make sense where the
speech actually interferes with the university’s own message and
educational mission.209 Otherwise, the university risks nullifying
the speech interests of its students. Understood in this way, it was
not appropriate to apply the government speech doctrine to
NORML’s use of ISU’s trademark because the group’s message
was not, in fact, interfering with ISU’s educational mission. While
not advocating for drug use, which might be permissibly censored
under Morse, political dialogue and advocacy for legislative
change is certainly consistent with the educational mission of an
institution of higher education like ISU.
B. Muddied Waters of Forum Analysis
Even if the Gerlich court was doctrinally correct in refusing to
extend the government speech doctrine to the case of university
trademarks, it was not necessarily appropriate for it to consider the
trademark a limited public forum.210 In the case of ISU’s
trademark, the Eighth Circuit failed to appreciate the purpose for
which such a forum would have been created by the university.211
208

See Bowman, supra note 129, at 282.
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423–24 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring);
Bowman, supra note 129, at 282.
210
See Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2017)
(identifying the university’s trademark as a limited public forum).
211
Compare id. at 714 (Kelly, J., concurring) (assuming without discussing ISU’s
purported purpose of its trademark as a “forum” for student expression) with id. at 719–
209
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The purpose for which a forum is made accessible to the public for
private expression is a central feature of a limited public forum; the
purpose of the forum is what actually dictates whether the
distinction between allowed and excluded speech is permissible
under the First Amendment.212 Yet courts have routinely failed to
consider the nature and purpose of government property,213 despite
the Supreme Court holding that as much is necessary in evaluating
the permissibility of censorship in a university’s limited
public forum.214
The purpose of ISU’s trademark licensing scheme (like that of
any other public university) was presumably to enhance the image
of the university and lend support to the messages of student
groups that were not inconsistent with its educational mission and
cultivated public image.215 The Student Organization Guidelines
demonstrate this limited scope of the “forum,” expressly granting
student organizations the privilege of using ISU’s trademarks,
subject to certain criteria.216 Student organizations like NORML
are certainly not entitled to use ISU’s trademark; they must fulfill
the requirements of ISU’s trademark use policy and fill out an
20 (Loken, J., dissenting) (recounting that “a limited public forum is not created absent
clear intent to create a public forum” and noting ISU’s “central purpose was to protect
and promote ISU’s public image, and the program guidelines explicitly reserve[d] the
forum for this purpose” which contributed to the complexity of the majority’s forum
analysis (citing Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988))).
212
See Christian Legal Soc’y Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687–88 (2010) (holding that, even in a limited public forum, a
university cannot exclude speech where the distinction is not reasonable view in light of
the purpose of the forum); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”).
213
See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 787 nn.232–33 (citing Robert Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1713, 1784–85 (1987) and Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1262–64 (2005)).
214
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 687–88.
215
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 3–4; Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 719–20
(Loken, J., dissenting).
216
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 719–20 (Loken, J., dissenting); Trademark Management
Policy Statement, supra, note 27.

820

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:777

application that lays out its proposed design incorporating the
trademark.217 Students are not given permission to use it unless it
conforms to specified guidelines.218 Indeed, Gerlich more closely
resembles an instance where the university has merely “reserved
eligibility” for a class of speakers who must then “individually,
obtain permission”—and the Supreme Court in Forbes has
specifically stated that such instances do not create a limited public
forum.219
The Gerlich court’s forum analysis is weakened also because
its reliance on traditional student speech cases not implicating the
expressive interests of a university trademark is tenuous. Unlike
Rosenberger220 and Gohn221, where university recognition and
funding was overtly necessary for the student groups to exercise
their First Amendment rights to association and free expression at
all,222 the speech of student organizations like NORML who are
denied use of ISU’s trademark is not actually cut off. In
Rosenberger and Gohn, funding was required in order for the
students to advocate for their viewpoint on gender and sexual
equality and effectively speak as a student organization on
campus.223 The Gerlich court’s reference to Martinez,224
Widmar,225 and Healy,226 in addition to Rosenberger, as “four
cases [in which] the Supreme Court has held that a university
217

See generally Guidelines for University Trademark Use by Student and Campus
Organizations, supra note 50.
218
See generally id.
219
See Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670 (1998).
220
See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 705 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
221
See id. at 705, 707 (discussing and analogizing the facts in Gerlich to those in Gay
and Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362–67 (8th Cir. 1988)); see also
supra note 109 (discussing the facts of Gohn and its parallels nearly one decade prior to
Rosenberger).
222
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830, 836 (noting that permitting viewpoint
discrimination in the funding of student organizations would exclude those viewpoints
from campus); Gohn, 850 F.2d at 366–68 (same).
223
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823.
224
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 710–11 (Kelly, J., concurring) (citing Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of Univ. Cal., Hastings Coll. Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685 (2010)).
225
Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)).
226
Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972)).
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creates a limited public forum when it distributes benefits to
recognized student groups” similarly misses this point.227
Analogies to Martinez suffer the same critique as Rosenberger and
Gohn in that imposing a school-wide nondiscrimination policy on
student groups’ operations created prerequisite conditions for the
student organization, and its speech, to occur on campus in the first
place.228 Similarly, university policy in Widmar, excluding
religious groups from the institution’s “open forum policy,”
manifestly denied religious groups the ability to express
themselves on campus.229 And the socialist student organization in
Healy depended on university recognition to exist on campus at
all.230 These cases are in stark contrast to the ultimate
consequences of denying a student group use of a trademark.
Student organizations like NORML still possess the ability to
speak on campus through their t-shirts without the use of the
university trademark. Alternatively, NORML students could have
altered their mode of expression to comply with ISU guidelines,
without changing their substantive message or viewpoint, to speak
with the trademark. In fact, ISU made it clear that NORML could
use its trademark to advocate the same pro-marijuana legislation
message by simply removing any explicit mention or image of a
marijuana leaf.231 Comparatively, NORML’s injury in being
denied permission to use ISU’s trademark can at best be described
as an indirect burden on its expression.
The nature of the “forum” in these cases is different as well. In
both Rosenberger and Gohn, the university funds granted to
student organizations passed from the university to the students
themselves to be spent upon their own volition in pursuit of their
advocacy.232 By contrast, even though NORML conveyed
considerable expression of its own through ISU’s trademark,
property rights to ISU’s trademark never changed hands. ISU at all
227

See id. at 710–11 (Kelly, J., concurring).
See Martinez, 561 U.S. at 685.
229
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
230
See Healy, 408 U.S at 181–82.
231
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 703.
232
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825–26
(1995); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1988).
228
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times owned and possessed its intellectual property, even though
use was permitted.233 ISU retained a vested property interest in its
trademark’s value, which the Gerlich court ignored.234 This begs
the question: If ISU created a limited public forum by making its
trademark available to student organizations, does it similarly do
so when licensing them to private companies outside the
university? Does the university then impermissibly discriminate
based on viewpoint every time it rejects a third party’s trademark
license application?
The concurring opinion in Gerlich brings a persuasive
counterargument to this point.235 It was undisputed that ISU
adopted its trademark policy changes after NORML used its initial
design.236 The design was not disapproved on the basis of its
reference to drugs in the first instance, so why was it a matter of
such concern the second time around? The concurrence correctly
points to Supreme Court case law decreeing that “[t]he existence of
reasonable grounds for limiting access to [even a] nonpublic
forum . . . will not save a regulation that is in reality a façade for
viewpoint-based discrimination.”237 Indeed, universities, and the
government at large, cannot be allowed to censor speech after the
fact, only when certain ramifications of the speech that it does not
like occur.238 At the end of the day, it is not quite defensible to
assert, as ISU did throughout litigation, that it did not engage in
viewpoint discrimination against NORML and its student
participants. Yet, it is simply incorrect to state that ISU, as a
government entity, did not possess expressive interests or a
viewpoint of its own associated with its registered trademark only
because it had lent out use of the trademark to student groups
expressing a wide variety of views.239
233

See generally Trademark Management Policy, supra note 27; Guidelines for
University Trademark Use by Student and Campus Organizations, supra note 50.
234
See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 697.
235
See id. at 710–16 (Kelly, J., concurring).
236
See id. at 701–03.
237
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
238
See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (2005).
239
See supra note 94 and accompanying text; cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679–80 (1998) (distinguishing between cases of “general access”
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On the other hand, it is an inescapable conclusion that
universities perform viewpoint discrimination in one way or
another, whether it be in the classroom or out. Indeed, “viewpoint
discrimination is inextricably a part of education. One cannot
communicate the messages involved in an educational process
without exercising choice—without choosing some messages and
not others; and without making these choices on the basis of the
content of the available alternatives.”240 If universities are to be
financially and organizationally operable, without every decision
instigating dispute and litigation, then First Amendment analysis of
student speech rights must accommodate some degree of viewpoint
discrimination that is currently not permissible in forum analysis.
However, it can be safely said, as Judge Kelly’s concurrence
pointed out, that it is clearly established that public universities
cannot do so “simply because it finds the views expressed by any
group to be abhorrent.”241
IV. RECOMMENDATION: LESSONS FROM THE GERLICH CLASSROOM
Once courts accept that there are instances where expressive
activity carries the interests of both students and their university, it
is clear that a new approach must be taken to understanding these
instances of “mixed speech” where such interests are competing
and, often, entirely at odds. The Gerlich case on the campus of
Iowa State University presents one such instance—mixed-speech
cases in the university setting are not new, and will not go away.242
that constitute a designated or limited public forum, and “selective access” which
constitute nonpublic a forum).
240
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 159, at 1420.
241
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 715 (Kelly, J., concurring) (quoting Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972)).
242
Social media and online technology are already playing a large role in school speech
cases. See Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 275, 281 (4th Cir. 2008) (ruling
that a public school district’s use of its website to promote a position on pending
legislation before the state legislature constitute government speech not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny). Access to speech on government-maintained social media sites is
also a subject of debate among scholars. See generally Alissa Ardito, Social Media,
Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301 (2013)
(arguing that, while some have argued for application of the government speech doctrine
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While there are certainly more intellectually-rigorous pursuits that
courts can—and should—embark on when analyzing free speech
claims from students expressing themselves on university
campuses, there are also more practical approaches that institutions
of higher education can pursue when navigating the muddied
waters of student free speech rights to fairly accommodate student
expression on campus.
A. Judicial Approaches to “Mixed Speech” Issues on College
Campuses
First and foremost, courts should stop viewing speech
occurring in the higher education setting on a public-private
binary. As described above, this system pits the interests of higher
education institutions in maintaining their image against the
interests of their students in seeking to grow as intellectuals and
citizens. It is, ultimately, a zero-sum game. And the Gerlich ruling
perpetuates this zero-sum confrontation between ISU and its
students.243 The result of similar rulings will be to exacerbate and
intensify relations between university officials and students on
campuses across the country, at a time when tensions among
civically-minded students are already at an all-time high.244
Judicial rulings that take the time to weigh the respective interests
of both parties, by contrast, recognize the fact that both parties are
to federal government agency social media sites, public forum analysis is more
appropriate).
243
See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 705.
244
See generally Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163 (2018) (noting that conflicting speech rights, both between
students and between students and their universities, have been occurring with greater
frequency and adding to heightened political tension on college campuses). The tensions
existing on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley are an especially apt
example of what is in store for universities when student free speech rights are not
properly defined. See Conor Friedersdorf, UC Berkeley Declares Itself Unsafe for Ann
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
20,
2017),
Coulter,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/uc-berkeley-declares-itself-unsafefor-ann-coulter/523668/ [https://perma.cc/Z6FN-ZXFW]; see also Eugene Volokh, UC
Berkeley’s Chancellor’s Message on Free Speech, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/23/uc-berkeleychancellors-message-on-free-speech/?utm_term=.2a6b805153b6
[https://perma.cc/UTW7-MCTJ].
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engaging in constitutionally-significant expressive activity. Even if
a court ultimately concludes that the speech rights of the students
involved (or their on-campus organizations) should prevail in a
given First Amendment showdown, such a result is more
intellectually honest and in practice achieves a more just result.245
In the Gerlich case, it can hardly be disputed that ISU has a
legitimate proprietary interest in the use of its trademark. However,
the particular facts of this case ultimately condemn it, even under a
more favorable analysis. While recognizing that ISU has a
significant interest in the use of its intentionally-branded
trademark, courts and the legal community should not accept the
fact that ISU changed its policies specifically to exclude
NORML’s proposed message as rationale for maintaining the
university’s expressive interest in its trademark.
B. Lessons from Gerlich: What Higher Education Institutions Can
Do to Limit Liability When Licensing Official University
Trademarks to Student Organizations
Aside from the more academic discussion in analyzing Free
Speech claims from students on college campuses, colleges and
245

Applying Hazelwood might be a strong temptation for courts seeking to confront the
concerns addressed in this Article and balance the conflicting expressive interests present
in mixed speech cases. University trademarks certainly carry the imprimatur of the school
with which they associate. In its application to Gerlich, for instance, where the trademark
is used by a student organization, NORML intended their message to be associated with
ISU and the organization’s message was, in fact, attributed to the school. See Gerlich III,
861 F.3d at 701–04; Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 9. Cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 405 (“Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one could reasonably
believe that [the student’s] banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”). But Hazelwood’s
applicability, even under a generous reading of that case, is tenuous at best. Hazelwood’s
core recognition of the school’s imprimatur is central to recognizing that university
activity may impute expressive interests into an instance of student speech to create a
mixed speech dilemma. But in the case of student organizations’ use of the university’s
trademark, there is no immediate pedagogical interest at stake or even direct faculty
oversight. See Dickens, supra note 187; LoMonte, supra note 180, at 362–63 (“Although
Hazelwood did not deprive students of all First Amendment protection—the burden
remains on the government to come forward with a justification “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns”—in practice, the Hazelwood standard has become a
virtual rubber stamp for whatever excuse for censorship a school can muster.”).
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universities can take Gerlich as a learning opportunity to
accommodate student speech while managing its own expressive
interests. Gerlich illustrates how to avoid legal pitfalls and
negative publicity.246 Crucially, institutions of higher education
must expressly define those “forums” which are opened to
expressive use by student organizations and others seeking
association with the university through their trademarks.
Universities must, in other words, preemptively declare the
purpose for which that intellectual property “forum” is available
for use by student organizations. Just as universities can publically
declare for what specific type of expression and association they
intend to make an empty classroom available after hours, they can
similarly articulate the extent to which their trademarks are
available for student use. At least one university has already done
so, broadly reserving the right to restrict the future use of any
“forum” associated with that university to its defined purpose,
while maintaining its ability to also promote its own message.247
Along these lines, a general policy on usage standards
articulating the permitted and prohibited uses of the licensed
trademark would serve universities well as a pre-established,
viewpoint-neutral standard to manage its institutional message and
associational imprimatur.248 Specific to Gerlich and university
trademark policies, higher education institutions should include in
their policies a declaration of what it intends the trademark to
convey and the purpose behind licensees’ use.249
Whether it is a university’s intent to endorse a specific message
of a particular student group, adopt an array of diverse and
multifaceted viewpoints, or convey its own institutional message, a
university can and should take the opportunity to articulate its
official trademark use policy. Doing so establishes clarity and
transparency to place interested licensees, such as student
246
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organizations, on notice of university expectations. Moreover,
strategic planning on an official usage standard aids in the
prevention of highly public confrontations with its students and
embarrassing public fallout; at the same time, it also avoids First
Amendment violations against its students. Gerlich should serve as
a wake-up call to higher education institutions across the country:
failing to articulate and define the university’s own expressive
interests and the standards of associational messaging like
trademarks invites conflict between university officials and student
groups. In sum, higher education institutions should have a
thoroughly thought-out, well-articulated, and defined policy
regarding their students’ use of their intellectual property—written
and reviewed by legal counsel. An important takeaway from
Gerlich is that the restrictions ISU put in place would almost
certainly have been constitutionally permissible had they been
established from the onset of NORML’s use of the trademark, as
opposed to being established as a response to the group’s
controversial viewpoint.250
As a final and obvious point, universities should not deviate
from their established trademark use policies and involve legal
counsel earlier in the process when handling interactions between
the university and its student organizations to ensure compliance.
This is true even regarding those interactions that do not involve
the use of university trademarks. Student affairs concerning the
freedom of speech—especially those touching controversial social
and political issues—have become highly sensitive matters that
require careful forethought and planning to avoid constitutional
infirmity.251 In short, universities must do anything they can to
avoid allegations of viewpoint discrimination by applying their use
standards and licensing requirements equally to all groups. And
250
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when the instance arises when the license to use a trademark is
denied, universities should thoroughly explain why the license
application was denied and work with the student organization to
help cure the defect.252 Gerlich serves as a case in point. Even if
the underlying rationale behind the Gerlich decision is
conceptually flawed, the fact remains that the change in trademark
use policy was a direct reaction to NORML’s legislative advocacy
and the publicity it received; the timing of ISU officials’ actions
cannot be ignored.253 Had legal counsel been involved earlier, and
a more thoroughly-prepared licensee use policy defining the ISU’s
expressive interest established and adhered to, a thought-out
approach to altering the university’s trademark-use policy could
have been crafted to achieve its needs without serving as a
rebuke—intentional or not—to the viewpoint expressed by
students seeking to use the trademark in association with their
campus organization.254 In short, the best measure institutions of
higher education can take is to employ legally-trained
professionals to engage and forge relationships with the students at
the heart of ideological debates, establishing the university’s role
in student expression and political discourse before it is caught in
an undesirable position.
CONCLUSION
Instances of speech and expression on college campuses are
rarely as straightforward as they appear—Gerlich v. Leath
provides an excellent example of how some speech by university
students naturally implicates legitimate concerns and interests by
institutions of higher education.255 Courts presiding over campus
speech disputes often fail to recognize such cases as “mixed
speech” incidences, which has led to an incoherent and messy
body of case law.256 As it currently stands, First Amendment
jurisprudence fails to reconcile these two often competing interests
252
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in expressive activity on college campuses.257 Gerlich is no
different.258 Yet, both parties’ arguments in Gerlich miss the
mark.259 Classifying student expression that implicates the
university’s imprimatur or public image, like ISU’s federallyregistered trademark, as government speech is problematic in that
it wholly exempts the students’ speech from judicial review and
protection of the First Amendment.260 On the other hand, a
doctrine that automatically allows a federal court to label a
university’s intellectual property a “limited public forum” without
further inquiry ignores the institution’s proprietary interest and
associational concerns with the trademark’s use.261 Courts can
learn from the Gerlich decision by opting out of this public-private
binary, and fairly adjudicating the merits of each party’s interests
in the expressive activity. This process would establish a way for
universities to navigate the tumultuous political activity occurring
on their campuses. Finally, higher education institutions should
learn from Gerlich and craft their trademark use policies in such a
way as to articulate the university’s First Amendment interest in
the trademark and narrowly define the purpose for which it is to
serve as a “forum” for student expression.262
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